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Climate Change and Legitimate
Governance
LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION LAW AND
POLICY IN CALIFORNIA
Thomas D. Beamish,† Ryken Grattet†† & Debbie Niemeier*
INTRODUCTION
Effectively responding to climate change poses a direct
challenge to contemporary systems of governance.1 As a problem,
climate change crosses jurisdictions2 and levels of government;3
manifests as a long-term, incremental, and diffuse set of impacts;4
and requires changes to deeply established ways of living and
modes of economic exchange.5 It should therefore be unsurprising
that governments have been slow to respond.6 And when
governments have taken action in the United States, it has often
taken form as novel, if not entirely new, subnational governance
† Professor, Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis.
†† Professor, Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis.
* Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University
of California, Davis. The authors are grateful to Brooklyn Law School and the generous
comments made by those who participated in its Trager Symposium, “The Post-Carbon
World: Advances in Legal and Social Theory,” where this paper was presented on
February 19, 2016.
1 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4–5, 76–93 (2009);
THE GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND ETHICS 1–
2 (David Held et al. eds., 2011); see KARIMARIENORGAARD, LIVING IN DENIAL: CLIMATE
CHANGE, EMOTIONS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3–4 (2011).
2 GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN AMERICA 8
(Barry G. Rabe ed., 2010).
3 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 122 (1992); Michele M. Betsill & Harriet
Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 141, 149–59 (2006).
4 See RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 40–49 (2015), https://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf [https://
perma.cc/95RM-JQJB].
5 NORGAARD, supra note 1, at 3–4; Karen Ehrhardt-Martinez et al.,
Mitigating Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 199 (2015) (Riley E. Dunlap & Robert J. Brulle eds., 2015).
6 See DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET, at xxxiii–xxxiv (2011).
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strategies such as cap-and-trade systems,7 carbon taxation,8 and
transportation and land-use regulations.9 This is largely because
partisan interests and stakeholders have rejected federal level
top-down regulatory forms of government.10 Even when climate
change policy advocates have sound technical and scientific
rationales for their proposals and plans, significant effort must
be devoted to legitimizing preferred policies or solutions. Indeed,
there seems to be a basic tension between policy strategies that
will reliably reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) and policy
strategies that are harmonious with currently prevailing
governance expectations.11 Reflecting these tensions, climate
change has become as much a sociopolitical problem as a strictly
“environmental” one.12
The governance issues and tensions that arise and the
strategies policy advocates deploy to overcome them beg questions
about whether emerging policy processes that address climate
change prioritize “policy legitimacy,” such that it comports with
popular beliefs and expectations, or “policy effectiveness,” such as
acceptably reducing GHG emissions.13 In an earlier work, we
investigated a novel policy strategy and process that emerged in
Sacramento, California, to address urban development and found
that, based on its success with regional stakeholders, the policy
strategy became the basis for one of California’s landmark
climate policies—the Sustainable Communities and Climate
Protection Act of 2008 (SB 375).14 From our research, we
concluded that the pursuit of legitimacy overwhelmed the
policy imperative for an effective urban development and GHG
7 See generally Henrik Hasselknippe, Systems for Carbon Trading: An
Overview, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y S43, S43–S57 (2003).
8 Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 499–503 (2009).
9 Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State
and Local Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and
Preserve Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
121, 126–29 (2009).
10 HARRIET BULKELEY & PETER NEWELL, GOVERNING CLIMATE CHANGE
(2d ed. 2015).
11 Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, ‘Governance’ as a Bridge
Between Disciplines: Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and
Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy, 43 EUR. J. POL. RES. 143, 143–44
(2004) (discussing the ways in which governance expectations are shifting in several
contemporary policy domains which has threatened the legitimacy of governance systems).
12 See GIDDENS, supra note 1, at 229–30.
13 See Ian Bache et al., Symbolic Meta-Policy: (Not) Tackling Climate Change
in the Transport Sector, 63 POL. STUD. 830, 830–31 (2014).
14 Deb Niemeier, Ryken Grattet & Thomas Beamish, “Blueprinting” and Climate
Change: Regional Governance and Civic Participation in Land Use and Transportation
Planning, 33 ENV’T&PLAN. C: GOV’T&POL’Y 1600, 1600–15 (2015).
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mitigation solution.15 In this context, “legitimacy” refers to a
process designed to reflect and reinforce stakeholder perceptions
that the actions of a governing body are proper and appropriate
given prevailing expectations regarding authority and its
application as reflected in norms, values, and beliefs of society.
The policy process we investigated was called the
“Blueprint Plan,”16 which sought to reshape regional
transportation and land-use planning in an effort to mitigate
urban ills associated with unplanned regional development,
including traffic congestion, air pollution, and urban sprawl. In
2008, this same policy process emerged as a cornerstone of SB
375, which focused on reducing regional GHG emissions through
better coupling of land use and transportation.17 Although backed
by state law, authority for the implementation of the Blueprint
Plan was delegated to relatively weak regional governance
entities called “Metropolitan Planning Organizations” (MPOs),
who are forced, by their lack of either command authority or
significant incentive, to seek regional consensus regarding their
transportation plans.18 In this context, and despite the promise
the general blueprinting process showed for unifying regional
stakeholders and the accolades bestowed upon it, the Blueprint
Plan seemed unlikely to result in significant GHG reductions.19
Indeed, the Blueprint Plan and the blueprinting policy process,
we concluded, was unlikely to reach the 2020 GHG levels
mandated by the State of California in its landmark Assembly
Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32).20
Given that the Blueprint Plan’s actual accomplishment
of GHG reductions has yet to be realized, this article takes a
closer look at the policy strategies its advocates deployed to
cultivate the social and political legitimacy necessary to gain
approval for their preferred Blueprint Plan. Part I reviews the
15 See id. at 1614–16.
16 For further details on the Blueprint Plan, see SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL
OFGOV’TS, http://www.sacregionBlueprint.org/ [https://perma.cc/H5WV-UZQ9].
17 Sacramento Region: The Evolution of Integrated Transportation Planning:
Hearing on S. 1733 Before the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works 11th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Mike McKeever, Executive Director, Sacramento Area Council of
Governments).
18 For an overview of the role of metropolitan planning organizations, see PAULG.
LEWIS & MARY SPRAGUE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY
AND THE ROLE OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 27–42 (1997),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_497PLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ESE-NVAB].
19 Niemeier, Grattet & Beamish, supra note 14, at 1614–15.
20 Id. While emissions have dropped, further dramatic reductions are going to be
necessary to reach the 2020 and 2030 goals. See Kate Galbraith, Question: How Hard Will It
Be to Meet 2030 and 2050 Greenhouse-Gas Reduction Goals?, CALMATTERS (July 18, 2015),
https://calmatters.org/articles/how-hard-will-it-be-to-meet-2030-and-2050-greenhouse-gas-
reduction-goals/ [https://perma.cc/E7R9-F7L6].
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sociological and political science literature on legitimacy and
legitimation. Part II describes California’s climate change policy
initiatives AB 3221 and SB 37522 as important aspects of the
context within which the Blueprint Plan emerged. Part III
offers a typology of legitimation strategies that emerged from
our investigations of the blueprinting process that took place in
Sacramento. The typology delineates structural, popular,
technical, and professional forms of legitimacy. The typology of
legitimacy developed in this paper is germane to understanding
governance strategies and types, broadly construed, especially in
the governance of climate change. This conceptual typology
expands understanding of the existing theoretical treatments of
legitimacy by focusing on the multi-dimensional nature of the
concept. Specifically, this article shows how different sorts of
legitimacy are gained (and by implication, can be lost) as well as
how this affects the design and implementation of potentially
contentious policy initiatives, particularly those associated with
climate change.
I. LEGITIMACY ANDGOVERNING
Legitimacy is a storied concept in the social sciences and
within political theory more generally. In the eighteenth century,
in his Two Treatises of Government, John Locke argued that
explicit and implied consent were essential foundations for
“legitimate” government.23 In the nineteenth century, Max Weber
delineated three forms of “legitimate authority”: traditional,
charismatic, and legal-rational.24 The last, Weber claimed, was
prototypical in modern western societies.25 After World War II,
legitimacy remained at the center of political theories of
government and in understandings of how the government
exercised “soft power.”26 For instance, political scientist Seymour
Martin Lipset argued that legitimacy, along with economic
development, were “social requisites of democracy.”27
21 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, AB 32, 2015–2016 Leg.
Sess., Reg. Sess., ch. 488 (2006).
22 SB 375, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
23 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 131 (1713), http://www.the
federalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Two-Treatises-of-Government-by-John-
Locke.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6N7-53UH].
24 Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUBLICATIONS
IN SOC’Y& INSTITUTIONS 1, 1–11 (1958).
25 Id.
26 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004).
27 Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 69–105 (1959).
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In the 1970s, neo-Marxists moved away from materialist
explanations of authority and state rule and toward the role that
ideology and cultural legitimation played in relations within
modernity’s institutional triumvirate of state, market, and civil
society.28 In this vein, both O’Connor and Habermas argued that
modern “capitalist states” in pursuing contradictory functions—
both capital accumulation and social harmony—must repeatedly
intervene to avert the economic and social crises that are
endemic to capitalism.29 Doing so, however, exposes the state as
a partisan political interest that supports capital accumulation,
which neo-Marxists claim undermines its legitimacy to govern
as a neutral arbiter of social order.30
More recently, those who study risk and “risk societies”
have also noted the important, contradictory, and even contested
role that legitimacy plays in contemporary governing and
governance processes.31 Risk society theorists focus on the role
that risk and its management play in cultivating reliance on state
and societal trustees, like government, while simultaneously
undermining trust in the same trustee institutions.32 Because the
modern state acts as both a manager and a creator of risk—e.g.,
nuclear, chemical, biological, and climate related—public faith
in the “modern project” and social trust in it has become
increasingly tenuous, divided, and provisional.33 There is a
paradox then, in that the state is both the producer of large-
scale risks in society and also the protector, expected to secure
society from such risks. In the words of risk theorist Zygmont
Bauman, “The problem is not only that we are facing challenges
on an undreamt of scale, but, more profoundly, that all attempts
28 JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE 180–81 (1973).
29 Id. at 6; JÜRGENHABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 52–53 (1975).
30 See O’CONNOR, supra note 28, at 6; see also Morris Zelditch, Jr., Theories of
Legitimacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY,
JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUPRELATIONS 33–53 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
31 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 20 (Mark Ritter
trans., 1992); Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?: Ecological
Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties, 13 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y
1, 2–32 (1996).
32 The “Risk Society” label distinguishes the present from past “modern society”
and the contemporary preoccupation with the future, the potential for safety or harm, and
predicting the relationship between them (i.e., the risks). See Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention
of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization, inULRICHBECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE
MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND AESTHETICS IN THEMODERN SOCIALORDER 1–6
(1994); ANTHONYGIDDENS, THECONSEQUENCES OFMODERNITY 83–92 (1990).
33 See GIDDENS, supra note 32, at 79–100; Beck, supra note 32, at 51–52, 58–91;
William R. Freudenburg, The ‘Risk Society’ Reconsidered: Recreancy, the Division of
Labor, and Risks to the Social Fabric, in RISK IN THE MODERN AGE: SOCIAL THEORY,
SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 107–122 (Maurie J. Cohen ed., 2000);
James F. Short, Jr., The Social Fabric at Risk: Toward the Social Transformation of Risk
Analysis, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 711, 711–12 (1984).
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at solution bear in themselves the seed of new and more difficult
problems.”34 This reflects a seemingly irreconcilable catch-22 in
which solutions are rarely the end of a problem.
A. Institutions, Organizations, and Legitimacy
While broad theories of the state and legitimacy are
useful for shedding light on the general societal conditions that
give rise to tensions inherent in contemporary governing, neo-
institutionalist theory focuses on how organizations of all kinds
both seek out legitimacy via their strategic behaviors and also
literally reflect legitimacy in their organizational environments
via their methods of organization. Reflecting this, neo-
institutionalist Marc Suchman defines legitimacy as “a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”35
Organizations are therefore structured to reflect broadly held
and often taken-for-granted assumptions about how they
“should look and act,” including the procedures they have in
place to do the work of the organization, the roles of different
organizational actors, and the rules and criteria for how work
is to be done. In this context, “formal structure” refers to the
codified ways actors within the organization relate to one
another, as well as the policies and procedures organizations
use to govern the work of the organization.36
Formal structures represent the manifest aspects of
organization such as organizational hierarchy, roles, rules, and
contracts.37 The elements of formal structure are typically
contrasted with informal practices or routines.38 These informal
practices include the ways the work of the organization is
actually done, and represent the “back stage” or “latent” aspects
of the organization. Formal structure, as codified in policies,
charters, and organizational directives, therefore acts as a
34 RISK, ENVIRONMENT&MODERNITY 38 (Scott Lash et al. eds., 1996).
35 Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995) [hereinafter Suchman, Managing
Legitimacy]; see Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 912–15
(1996).
36 John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341–42 (1977).
37 W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS ANDORGANIZATIONS 151–79 (2d ed. 2001).
38 See ALVIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 24–26
(1954); Tim Hallett & Marc J. Ventresca, Inhabited Institutions: Social Interactions and
Organizational Forms in Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, 35 THEORY &
SOC’Y 213 (2006).
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blueprint for the activities of the organization. Institutionalists
view formal structure not only as a means that organizations use
to achieve discrete ends but also as an important symbolic form of
communication to both employees and the external environments
within which they operate.39 Indeed, institutional and neo-
institutional research has consistently found that while the
manifest and latent aspects of formal organization can
complement and correspond with one another, they can, and
frequently do, contradict one another as well.40 In this regard,
organizational structures are best conceptualized as “loosely
coupled” to one another, but are easily “decoupled” insofar as the
accomplishment of one organizational goal may not cohere with,
or aid the accomplishment of, other organizational goals.41
Based on observation of organizational decoupling, early
institutionalism emphasized how organizations and their
members can be “co-opted” by outside political interests. Members
can pursue the co-optation of outside interests that they desire to
ally with or that threaten them and their plans.42 More recently,
scholars tend to focus on what organizational behaviors such as
decoupling, co-optation, and isomorphism43 actually reflect. Here,
scholars note that high levels of uncertainty, when paired with
difficult-to-measure outcomes, can push organizations towards
merely seeking legitimacy rather than focusing on strategies that
promote efficiency and effectiveness.44 Legitimacy-seeking
involves organizations pursuing mimesis and conforming to
prevailing norms and standards within the industry, sector, or,
more generally, society as a whole.45
The institutionalist perspective supplies a counter-
thesis to a prevailing view of organizations as simply rational
tools deployed by their masters to achieve certain goals.46 By
39 See SCOTT, supra note 37, at 77–79.
40 Neil Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An
Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919–1979,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter Powell & Paul
DiMaggio eds., 1991); see GOULDNER, supra note 38, at 24–27; PHILIP SELZNICK,
LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 5–7 (1957).
41 Meyer & Rowan, supra note 36, at 341–42, 357.
42 PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION 13 (1949). Organizational cooptation, which according to
Selznick reflects institutionalization processes, occurs when organizational insiders
take on the views of those from outside the organization as their own views. Id.
43 Isomorphism involves organizations mimicking similar organizations for
reasons of symbolic legitimacy rather than behavioral efficiency. See Paul J. DiMaggio
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Case Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 152 (1983).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Eva Boxenbaum & Stefan Jonsson, Isomorphism, Diffusion and
Decoupling, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 78–94 (2008);
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contrast, institutionalists view organizations as representing
the ongoing social accomplishments of their members. In other
words, institutionalists believe that the formal goals, metrics,
and structures often associated with an organization’s rational
manifestation are always supplemented, complicated, and even
undermined by less formal and latent aspects that arise as
members interact with one another and their environments
over time.47
Beyond “decoupling,” recent institutionalist theory has
focused on delineating different dimensions and even kinds of
legitimacy. In this vein, a handful of legitimacy schemes have
been put forward.48 Some schemes identify legitimacy that
emerges directly from interest groups called “pragmatic
legitimacy”49 or “sociopolitical legitimacy.”50 Others identify
legitimacy that emerges from shared morals and norms,51 while
others identify the cognitive or cultural sources of legitimation.52
Conceptualizations like these mostly reflect variation in
researcher focus; different forms of legitimacy result from
different sources, contexts, and environments. The next section
focuses on the role of legitimacy in policymaking and policy
implementation processes, the focal point of this article.
B. Policy Processes and Legitimacy
During the 1970s and 1980s, public pressure regarding a
range of environmental and technological issues led to social and
political conflict regarding federal and state level policy and
Patricia Bromley & Walter W. Powell, From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk:
Decoupling in the Contemporary World, 6 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 483 (2012); Kaisa E.
Snellman,Window-Dressers and Closet Conformists: Organizational Decoupling Revisited, 1
ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 1 (2012). See examples of the “rational tools” approach to organizations
in the work of ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1–3, 6–7 (1977); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver Williamson,
Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY (N. Smelser & R. Swedberg eds., 1994).
47 See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 43, at 147; W. RICHARD SCOTT,
ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, ANDOPEN SYSTEMS 351–52 (5th ed. 2003).
48 See David L. Deephouse & Mark Suchman, Legitimacy in Organizational
Institutionalism, in THE SAGEHANDBOOK OFORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM (2008).
49 Suchman,Managing Legitimacy, supra note 35, at 578.
50 Howard E. Aldrich & C. Marlene Fiol, Fools Rush In? The Institutional Context
of Industry Creation, 19 ACAD.MGMT. REV. 645, 661 (1994).
51 See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 37, at 134–36.
52 Matthew E. Archibald, Between Isomorphism and Market Partitioning: How
Organizational Competencies and Resources Foster Cultural and Sociopolitical Legitimacy,
and Promote Organizational Survival, 22 RES. SOC. ORGS. 171 (2004); Suchman,Managing
Legitimacy, supra note 35, at 582.
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policymaking processes.53 At that time, the public and many social
movements fought to open such policy processes to greater public
participation and feedback.54 Reflecting this civic push, federal
laws and acts, such as the National Environmental Protection Act
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,
as well as state acts like the California Environmental Quality
Act, among others, specified that federal and state governments—
and in some cases even particular industries—must both fulfill
new, more stringent, guidelines and open their internal decision-
making processes to greater public scrutiny in pursuing plans
and developments.55 Specifically, this meant that government
plans would be both more rationally managed—meaning experts
would technically assess the risks and benefits associated with a
proposed project before taking action—and involve greater
public examination and comment. Increased transparency and
public involvement promoted still greater levels of social and
political pressure that further stimulated public leaders to seek
greater legitimation for their policies and plans.56 The move
toward more technocratic and democratic governance
processes57 therefore reflects an effort on the part of the state to
gain greater public support, using new regulations that
emphasize technical justifications for policy approaches and a
“communities’ right-to-know.”58
53 THOMAS D. BEAMISH, SILENT SPILL: THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL
CRISIS 82–85 (2002).
54 Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and Political Conflict: Analyzing the
Issues, in CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS, at xi–xiii (Dorothy Nelkin
ed., 3d ed. 1992).
55 By plans and developments, we specifically mean both the introduction of
new technologies and technical systems into society as well as the pursuit of economic,
industrial, and/or urban developments that held both risks and benefits. Technological
examples include nuclear energy, chemicals, and biodefense and biotechnology.
Outsized infrastructural developments include proposals to mine and extract resources;
mega-projects like new highways, bridges, airports, and dams as well as other
infrastructural and industry focused proposals and expansions. See California
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189 (West. 2017); CAL.
CODE REGS., tit. 14, §§ 15000–15387 (2017); CYNTHIA CATES COLELLA, PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 17–18 (1981); What Is
EPCRA?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra [https://perma.cc/984B-JM4T];
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH (1981), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/
acir/Reports/policy/a-86.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9N2-R6T4].
56 See, e.g., STEVEN L. DEL SESTO, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND CONTROVERSY:
CIVILIANNUCLEAR POWER IN THEUNITED STATES, 1946–1974 (1979).
57 DOROTHY NELKIN, TECHNOLOGICAL DECISIONS AND DEMOCRACY: EUROPEAN
EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1977); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE:
SCIENCE ANDDEMOCRACY INEUROPE AND THEUNITED STATES (2005).
58 At the federal level, the public “right to know” and comment has been
institutionalized in policy processes such “environmental impact statements.” National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C § 4332 (2012). In cases where projects,
technologies, and development plans involve significant public funding, oversight, or
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Some areas where the democratic and technical demands
on the design of governance approaches are particularly
prominent are in transportation, land use, and environmental
policy-based decisions. In terms of the technical dimension
wherein experts seek to more rationally manage risks and
benefits, policymakers rely on models and modeling in most
urban policy decision making, and modelers spend a great deal
of time and effort justifying their models as critical to decision
making and for identifying policy solutions.59 There is a strong
desire to gain support for models, and with that support lend
credibility to modeling tools used by technical experts.60
Technocrats argue that new, ever more complicated and
behaviorally consistent models are necessary to reflect more
complex urban settings and societal contexts.61
Environmental policy scholars have also devoted attention
toward democratizing environmental policy processes. For
example, themes of collaboration, transparency, decision-making
process, and representation have gained importance over
time.62 Citizen and stakeholder involvement in planning
processes is now seen as critical to representing varied interests;
leaders rely on enlisting public collaboration in imagining future
development to reduce the number of potential clashes and
conflicts over policy choices.63
Technical and democratic elements, however, cannot be
assumed to comfortably coexist.64 A recurring theme within the
scholarship on policy processes posits tensions between technical
potential impact are compelled to provide technical assessments of their intended benefits
and probable/potential future risks as well as potential risk/cost-offsets before approval can
be granted. At the state level, for example, in 1986 California passed the California’s Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 also known as “Proposition 65” which
also stipulates public announcement and a community’s right to know it is being or has
been exposed to toxins. See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL.
HEALTH&SAFETYCODE § 25249.8 (West 2017).
59 See, e.g., David T. Hartgen, Hubris or Humility? Accuracy Issues for the Next
50 Years of Travel Demand Modeling, 40 TRANSP. 1133, 1133–34 (2013) (providing an
overview of the accuracy and relevance of forecasting models for public decision making).
60 M. Hatzopoulou & E.J. Miller, Transport Policy Evaluation in
Metropolitan Areas: The Role of Modelling in Decision-Making, 43 TRANSP. RES. PART
A 323, 330–35 (2009).
61 Soora Rasouli & Harry Timmermans, Activity-Based Models of Travel
Demand: Promises, Progress and Prospects, 18 INT’L J. URB. SCI. 31, 32–34 (2014).
62 Marian Barnes et al., Constituting ‘The Public’ in Public Participation, 81
PUB. ADMIN. 379, 379–80 (2008); Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change:
Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 51 ENV’T 12, 20–22 (2009).
63 See Richard Willson, Assessing Communicative Rationality as a
Transportation Planning Paradigm, 28 TRANSPORTATION 1, 14–15 (2001); Caron Chess
& Kristen Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What
Works?, 33 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2685, 2685–92 (1999).
64 Sheila Jasanoff, The Dilemma of Environmental Democracy, 13 ISSUES IN
SCI. & TECH. 63, 63–65 (1996).
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and democratic dimensions of policymaking.65 Policy processes
that too strongly emphasize technical aspects risk appearing
elitist and unresponsive to citizen values.66 Policy processes that
emphasize democratic elements are vulnerable to complaints that
the resulting policies do not square with the science—findings
that have been verified as reliable and valid—or that in seeking to
satisfy too many stakeholders, a policy compromises its coherence
and therefore what is necessary for it to achieve a stated
objective, such as lowering a specific pollutant or achieving
another desired environmental outcome.67
C. Risk Communication and Legitimacy
A final body of scholarship emphasizes the emergence
and centrality of the concept of risk—its management and the
minimization of harms—in debates about the design of
governance systems. According to this view, a fundamental
aspect of the state, and the legitimacy of government generally,
is reflected in its ability to predict and manage future threats
and ensure collective safety.68 This means that a key function of
any given governance system is to address and communicate
the nature of those risks and to identify the means by which
they can be managed.69
Like the work on policy processes reviewed above, both
experts and citizens are implicated in the process of “risk
communication.” Experts must figure out how to characterize
risks and citizens must be made to understand, and ultimately
vet, those characterizations and the plans designed to address
them.70 As pursued by government and industry, risk
communication strategy has currently taken form in what might
best be termed “risk communication ‘orthodoxy’”: quasi-formalized
governance strategies that are frequently deployed to both blunt
65 See e.g., Karin Bäckstrand, Civic Science for Sustainability: Reframing the
Role of Experts, Policy-Makers and Citizens in Environmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL. 24, 28–30 (2003).
66 See, e.g., DEL SESTO, supra note 56.
67 Dahl characterizes this tension between technical and popular drivers of policy
as between the priorities of citizen participation and system effectiveness. See Robert A.
Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation, 109 POL.
SCI. Q. 23, 23–34 (1994).
68 GIDDENS, supra note 32; Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62
MOD. L. REV. 1, 4, 9–10 (1999).
69 See Vincent T. Covello, Risk Communication: An Emerging Area of Health
Communication Research, in COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 359–373 (S.A. Deetz ed.,
1992); BEN SHEPPARD ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM &
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, UNDERSTANDING RISK COMMUNICATION THEORY: A GUIDE
FOR EMERGENCYMANAGERS AND COMMUNICATORS 4–6 (2012).
70 See, e.g., SHEPPARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 4, 6.
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and redirect (potential) public criticism and encourage public buy-
in and dialogue around a set of preferred policy principles or
policy options.71 Critics of risk communication contend that citizen
involvement frequently appears to be a ceremonial aspect,
rather than a substantively meaningful contribution. Before
they seek citizen input, technical experts have already made
the key decisions.72
Some important themes emerge from the diverse literature
regarding legitimacy. Early social theory recognized government’s
coercive authority as quite limited, and thus, conceptualized
legitimacy as a major functional imperative for the state.73 Risk
society theorists emphasize the ways in which states act both
as the creators and the managers of societal risks—the latter
requiring substantial attention to the legitimation of
governmental strategies. Alternatively, institutional theorists
focus on legitimacy as a key means by which organizations
interact with their environments; they identify decoupling of
formal structures from informal behavior as a common strategy
for separating the external legitimation of the organization from its
internal operations. Lessons from institutional research and theory
identify the multifaceted nature of legitimacy, and therefore the
multiple sources from which it can emerge and to identify and
understand the multiple strategies that can be pursued to gain (or
lose) it. Research on policy processes emphasizes the ways that
governance systems pursue legitimacy founded upon technical
expertise and executed through democratic processes; two
pursuits that, while holding the promise of better policy, can
also collide and create a basis for further conflict and policy
dysfunction. Finally, studies of risk communication highlight
how actors in governance systems understand, convey, and
seek legitimacy in their efforts to win over others to their view
of risk. These ideas provide a broad framework for our
investigation of legitimacy in the context of one of California’s
signature climate change initiatives.
II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP TO BLUEPRINTING
California has arguably pushed further than any other
state or the federal government in the design and implementation
71 THOMAS D. BEAMISH, COMMUNITY AT RISK: BIODEFENSE AND THE COLLECTIVE
SEARCH FORSECURITY 65–67 (2015).
72 Id. at 65–70.
73 Lipset, supra note 27, at 86–89; Weber, supra note 24, at 1.
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of laws and policies intended to reduce GHG emissions.74 In 2006,
the state adopted Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions
Act (AB 32),75 which was the first GHG reduction law in the
United States. The law mandates a reduction in state emissions
of GHGs to 1990 levels by the year 2020. In addition, the so-called
Pavley Law76 was passed in 2009, which established standards
that would reduce GHG emissions from motor vehicles.77 This was
followed by two Executive Orders which built on AB 32: S-21-09,
which focused on renewable energy and mandated a GHG
reduction of 80% below 1990 levels by 205078 and, most recently,
EO-B 30-15, which mandated an interim target of “40 percent
below 1990 levels by 2030.”79
These laws focus on three technological and material
changes: (1) increasing statewide usage of low carbon fuels; (2)
lowering emissions throughout all sectors; and (3) implementing a
carbon trading system.80 AB 32 charged the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) with regulating and setting greenhouse
gas targets for the state.81 Over the past ten years, CARB has
developed a range of regulatory initiatives that seek to fulfill
these three technological and material aspects, and in doing so
lower the state’s GHG footprint. For example, CARB has
required the generation of renewable energy, the use of cleaner
gasoline, and developed and implemented a cap-and-trade
program in the state.82 As a result, since 2005 GHG reductions
have seen modest declines in a number of sectors.83 However,
despite such progress, transportation emissions have not returned
to 1990 levels.84
74 See generally Katrina vanden Heuvel, Once Again, California Leads the
Way, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/once-again-
california-leads-the-way/2015/12/08/3bdc8cf4-9d0a-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html?
utm_term=.06bbe43b6bfa [https://perma.cc/NA5Q-35TX].
75 Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
76 Senator Fran Pavley, a Los Angeles County Democrat, authored the 2006 law.
77 Clean Car Standards, Assemb. B. 1493, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009)
(commonly referred to as the Pavley law).
78 Cal. Exec. Order S-21-09 (Sept. 15, 2009).
79 Cal. Exec. Order B-30-15 (Apr. 29, 2015).
80 CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CHANGE 5 (2008), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_
plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG9U-22XT]; CAL. AIR. RES. BD., PROPOSED FIRST UPDATE
TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: BUILDING ON THE FRAMEWORK 2 (2014),
http://www.ahrinet.org/App_Content/ahri/files/NEWSLETTER/2014/February/CA_Draf
t_Update_Climate_Change_Scoping_Plan_February_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y6A-723]
[hereinafter CAL. AIR. RES. BD., PROPOSEDFIRSTUPDATE].
81 Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
82 CAL. AIR. RES. BD., PROPOSED FIRSTUPDATE, supra note 80, at ES-2–ES-3.
83 Transportation and electricity generation saw modest GHG declines
between 2005 and 2014.
84 CAL. AIR. RES. BD., PROPOSED FIRSTUPDATE, supra note 80, at ES-2–ES-3.
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Very soon after AB 32 was passed, the legislature
enacted the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection
Act of 2008 (SB 375).85 SB 375 elaborated on the land use and
transportation planning dimensions of AB 32. It authorized the
California Air Resources Board to establish regional greenhouse
gas reduction targets and charged the state’s eighteen MPOs
with designing and implementing the necessary transportation
and land-use planning processes.86 MPOs are regional bodies
established in 1973 by the Federal-Aid Highway Act for the
purpose of distributing federal transportation funds;87 using
MPOs for the purposes of SB 375 implementation signaled a
recognition that transportation systems are best planned from
a regional scale rather than a city, county, or state scale.88
SB 375 specifically embraces Sacramento Area Council
of Governments’s (SACOG) regional approach to addressing
climate change as reflected in their Blueprint Plan and the
blueprinting process they deployed in ratifying that plan.89 In
relying on the framework developed by SACOG in its Blueprint
Plan, MPOs are urged to create long-range transportation and
land-use plans through an inclusive civic process that engages
regional stakeholders—business interests, civic groups,
organizations, and individual “citizen planners”—to weigh in
on regional development preferences.90
The roots of blueprinting stretch back before SB 375
and, therefore, prior to climate change as a policy focus. In
2002, SACOG initiated the Blueprint Plan in an effort to plan
transportation and housing development through the year
2050. SACOG was among the first in California to complete the
process and certainly the first to label their effort “blueprinting.”91
Modeled after efforts undertaken in Portland, Oregon, and Salt
Lake City, Utah, the objective of the Blueprint Plan was to
85 See SB 375, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
86 Mary D. Nichols, Sustainable Communities for a Sustainable State:
California’s Efforts to Curb Sprawl and Cut Global Warming Emissions, 12 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 185, 186 (2010).
87 MARK SOLOF, N.J. TRANSP. PLANNING AUTH. INC., HISTORY OFMETROPOLITAN
PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS 21 (1998), http://www.njtpa.org/getmedia/b95661af-dfd4-4e3d-bb
87-39e617619c7b/MPOhistory1998.pdf.aspx [https://perma.cc/8PB8-LYSJ].
88 See ELISA BARBOUR &MICHAEL TEITZ, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., BLUEPRINT
PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA: FORGING CONSENSUS ON METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT, at iv–v, 1 (2006), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_606EBOP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZK7R-LQJ5].
89 John Darakjian, Comment, SB 375: Promise, Compromise and the New
Urban Landscape, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 383–84 (2009).
90 See Greg Greenway, Getting the Green Light for Senate Bill 375: Public
Engagement for Climate-Friendly Land Use in California, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
433, 444–47 (2010).
91 BARBOUR& TEITZ, supra note 88, at 1 & nn.3–4.
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develop a regional plan that would densify urban growth, create
walkable neighborhoods, promote mixed-use development, increase
low-income housing, and expand the use of nonmotorized and
public transportation.92 SACOG expected that these mechanisms
would improve lower vehicle miles traveled, and as a result, reduce
urban sprawl.93 In short, the Blueprint Plan would encourage
“smart” regional metropolitan growth.94
Over its history, most growth in the Sacramento
metropolitan area has reflected short-term planning and
opportunistic development with little coordination across the
region’s communities and without sustained public input.95
Based on projections that by 2050 the Sacramento metropolitan
area would need to accommodate 1.7 million new residents and
twice the amount of current housing, SACOG imbued their
Blueprint Plan and agenda with a fair amount of urgency.96
The Blueprint Plan was also an attempt to break with the
“competitive localism,” wherein communities compete rather
than cooperate on land-use and transportation initiatives, and
to move towards a consensus-based regional planning process.97
The process was well received, winning a number of
prestigious environmental and planning awards.98 Again, the
92 VISIONPDX, PORTLAND 2030: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 58 (2008), https://
www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/168876 [https://perma.cc/T9WZ-6G2Q]. Utah’s
visioning plan is described here: ENVISION UTAH, THE HISTORY OF ENVISION UTAH,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-07/documents/envision_utah.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8WZ-EX9X].
93 Gabriel Baird, City’s Future at Center of Debate—A Regional Planning
Agency and Elk Grove Officials Both Claim to Have a Better Plan, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 21, 2004, at N1.
94 The concept of “smart growth” can encompass many things. SACOG’s
definition includes the following planning and transportation aspects: “[p]rovide a variety
of transportation choices”; “[o]ffer housing choices and opportunities”; “[t]ake advantage
of compact development”; “[u]se existing assets”; “[m]ixed land uses”; “[p]reserve open
space, farmland, natural beauty, through natural resources conservation”; and
“[e]ncourage distinctive, attractive communities with quality design.” SACOG, BETTER
WAYS TO GROW: EXAMPLES FROM THE SACRAMENTO REGION OF THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF
SMARTGROWTH 1 (2008).
95 See BARBOUR& TEITZ, supra note 88, at iii, 5–11.
96 SACOG, SPECIAL REPORT BLUEPRINT SUMMIT: A REVIEW OF 2004
REGIONAL FORUM REGIONAL REPORT 2–3 (2004).
97 BARBOUR& TEITZ, supra note 88, at 5.
98 As of 2010, the Blueprint Plan had been awarded the following:
Innovations in American Government Award by Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University; the California Governor’s Award for Environmental and Economic
Leadership; the Transportation Planning Excellence Award by the Federal Highway
Administration/Federal Transit Administration; the Presidential Citation from the
California Chapter of the American Institute of Architects; the Environmental Leadership
Award from the Environment Council of Sacramento; The Award for Smart Growth
Achievement from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; The “Thanks to You” Award
from the American Leadership Forum Mountain Valley Chapter; The Award for
Outstanding Achievement from the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations;
Community Development Award from the Sacramento Mutual Housing Association;
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Blueprint Plan was considered so successful that the legislature
modeled SB 375 after it.99 Initially blueprinting emerged as a
method to build consensus for developing long-range regional
plans. Later, blueprinting became a governance strategy that
regional MPOs in California and California state leaders
considered key to achieving statewide reductions in land-use-
and transportation-related GHGs.
III. CULTIVATING LEGITIMACY
SACOG deployed a multipronged approach that relied
on four distinctive legitimation strategies in their Blueprint Plan
as a means of gaining support and promoting their preferred
transportation and land-use plan. In general terms, governance
strategies involve different sorts of legitimacy depending on how
they are configured, what they seek to accomplish, and who or
what governing body is in charge of them. In SACOG’s case, the
Blueprint Plan involved a new regionalist policy approach to
transportation planning in which SACOG, as the governing
authority, had little command authority to compel compliance.
What is more, the California Legislature tasked SACOG with
creating and implementing a plan to address a nationally
contentious issue—climate change and GHG emissions—that could
involve a highly resistant metropolitan political environment.100
These circumstances pushed SACOG to cultivate greater levels of
public recognition and legitimacy to empower its agenda and exert
control over its programs, mandates, and associated
responsibilities. SACOG’s blueprinting efforts employed four types
of legitimacy that we identify and define below. These include:
structural, popular, technological, and professional.
Structural legitimacy refers to the way that the formal
structure of a governance entity—when in conformance with
deeply embedded, widely shared, and taken-for-granted
institutionalized rules—tends to gain credibility and, with that,
a good level of legitimacy. This structural aspect can reflect
both intraorganizational qualities and/or interorganizational
network characteristics. As a governance body, SACOG is
organizationally situated at the center of a broad network of
regional actors including cities, counties, and stakeholders such
and the Regional Clean Air Award from the American Lung Association Sacramento
Emigrant Trails. SACOG, SPECIAL REPORT: BLUEPRINT’S IMPACT ON THE REGION AND
RESIDENTSQUALITY OF LIFE 16 (2010).
99 MONICA ALTMAIER ET AL., CTR. FOR A SUSTAINABLE CAL., INST. OFURBAN &
REG’LDEV., MAKE ITWORK: IMPLEMENTING SENATE BILL 375, at 5–6 (2009).
100 See Darakjian, supra note 89, at 386, 397 & n.110.
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as interest-focused nongovernmental organizations,
representatives of industry and other commercial concerns, and
the general public.101 What is more, the formal measures SACOG
followed when engaged in transportation and land-use planning
were intended to align with contemporary beliefs and
expectations regarding the proper divisions of authority and
responsibility in publicly consequential decisions, as well as those
relating to how government ought to be organized, how decisions
ought to be made, and therefore how government can best fulfill
the common good.
By contrast, popular legitimacy refers to the ways that
governance entities attempt to reflect institutionalized expectations
concerning what constitutes proper governance processes and
public inclusion with regard to important decisions that affect the
public, as well as with their implementation once a decision has
been made. In Western-style democracies, this invariably involves
some level of transparency, civic representation, and citizen
involvement. Policy processes that involve citizens, therefore,
better satisfy democratic expectations. They are understood to
reflect local concerns and increase the legitimacy of the policy
decision that emerges from the governance system. Conversely,
governance arrangements that exclude such measures hazard
denunciation as secretive and “undemocratic” and, therefore, are
out of sync with community values or reflective of elite self-interest.
Distinct from popular appeals, technological legitimacy
refers to ways that governance entities try to cultivate the
impression that their actions are grounded in hard data and
that they rely on the latest technological tools—i.e., “high tech”
tools and solutions. Finally, professional legitimacy refers to
the ways that governance entities mirror or deploy symbols
associated with professional knowledge, state-of-the-art theory,
findings, and vetted metrics and standards. Professional
legitimacy reflects a context within which governance strategies
are used to display an alignment with expert opinion and where
the expert authority is grounded in a recognized body of
knowledge (see Table 1).
101 For information concerning SACOG see, About SACOG, http://www.sacog.
org/about-sacog [https://perma.cc/3GGH-KZDK].
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Parsing the features that distinguish different aspects of
legitimacy as an ideal type is a useful tool, both theoretically and
pragmatically, insofar as it exposes how governance institutions,
policies, and laws gain (or lose) adherents, quite apart from the
outcomes associated with them. Below, each type of legitimacy
introduced above is empirically developed as reflected in SACOG’s
Blueprint Plan and the blueprinting process.
A. Structural Legitimacy
By the end of the mid-twentieth century, political tensions
emerged in many Western democracies around two general
modes of organizing government and, with them, governance.103
The tension played out across a wide variety of policy domains.
The first mode founded authority to manage societal problems
and collective risks in a centralized body, often referred to as “the
state” or “the government,” that exercises the power to define,
102 I-PLACE3S, SACMET, and MEPLAN are state-of-the-art planning and
modeling software technologies. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Section III.C.
103 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 3; Bob Jessop, Liberalism,
Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective, 34 ANTIPODE
452, 452–72 (2002).
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implement, and enforce policies in the name of the public.104
Through the early part of the twentieth century, state criminal
justice policies, federal and state taxation, interstate and state
highway systems, and federal and state welfare policies were
largely organized under this “command model” of governance
both in the United States and elsewhere.105
More recently, political parties on the right, joined in
many cases by center-left coalitions, have favored a second mode
of organizing policy responses.106 This tack has generally
emphasized more decentralized, often market-based arrangements
that rely on incentives rather than sanctions, and on self-
regulation rather than command authority, to achieve desired
policy outcomes.107 These two governance modalities have been
contrasted in many theoretical and empirical works in the social
science field. These works frequently characterize the older
approaches as rooted in “command” or “command and control
model” and newer approaches as rooted in “market principles”
and “neoliberalism.”108
Currently, the tensions between command and neoliberal
governance models lie at the center of an ongoing debate about
how societies ought to respond to climate change. For example,
Professor Michael Hanemann characterizes the debate over
California’s landmark climate change policy, AB 32, as being
rooted in a conflict between “regulation” and “trading”
approaches—i.e., state-centered versus market-centered
governance forms.109 Increasingly, governments have hybridized
their policies to involve both command features and market
principles in order to realize the strengths of one or the other
and resolve the political tensions that accompany their singular
use. Scholars have referred to this middle path between either
governance extreme as a “third way” governance strategy.110 SB
375’s sponsor, Senator Darrell Steinberg, described the law in a
manner that very much echoed these larger ideological tensions:
104 David John Frank et al., The Nation-State and the Natural Environment
over the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96, 96–102.
105 For further discussion regarding the command model see DAVIDHARVEY, A
BRIEFHISTORY OFNEOLIBERALISM 51 (2005).
106 Id.
107 See id.
108 For a further discussion of neoliberalism see Jessop, supra note 103, at 454.
109 W.M. Hanemann, How California Came to Pass AB 32, the Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, at 25–26 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ. & Policy,
Working Paper No. 1040, 2007), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vb0j4d6 [https://
perma.cc/TPP5-4FVP].
110 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRDWAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
64–65 (1998).
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I think everyone recognizes that in order to meet the requirements of
this very aggressive law, we’re going to have to employ market-based
mechanisms, we’re going to have to regulate, and we’re going to have
to focus on mobile sources, stationary sources, and land use, which is
the subject of SB 375. Since this is such groundbreaking legislation,
there’s a lot of anxiety about the balance of those aspects. Many of us
on the Democratic side feel that, while market-based mechanisms
are important and should be part of the strategy, if we aren’t
aggressive in looking at the regulatory side, we’re not going to meet
the goals. The Republican side feels that if we regulate, we’re going
to harm the economy.111
SB 375’s governance model put into practice two
important concepts: “network governance” and “regionalism.” In
terms of the former, the legislature and the governor agreed to
statewide CO2 reduction targets with the details of operationalizing
the plan left to CARB.112 CARB further left planning and
implementation to regional MPOs who were tasked with
achieving targeted reductions by modifying their long-range
transportation and land-use plans.113 Therefore, MPOs like
SACOG were tasked with coordinating input from metropolitan
area cities and counties, and designing and implementing a long-
range transportation plan that would achieve GHG targets as
specified by CARB and state level legislation AB 32 and SB 375.114
As such, SACOG’s role in this governance network reflects
the contemporary impulse to balance command regulation with
bottom-up input and incentives.115 Higher levels of government
set a broad framework of rules and provide funding, but regions
and subregional units are given the autonomy to determine how
best to conform and achieve the policy goals set by those higher
levels of authority.116
In truth, the principles behind SACOG’s Blueprint Plan
were in place before climate change emerged in 2006 as a policy
issue in California.117 SACOG, as a regionalist governance
111 California’s SB 375 Would Tie Local Planning Decisions to Transportation
Funding, VERDEXCHANGE (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.verdexchange.org/news/
california’s-sb-375-would-tie-local-planning-decisions-transportation-funding [https://perma.
cc/72EY-V8CL].
112 Bill Fulton, SB 375 Is Now Law—but What Will It Do?, CAL. PLANNING &
DEV. REPORT (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.cp-dr.com/articles/node-2140 [https://perma.cc/6
DSX-DDDU].
113 California’s SB 375 Would Tie Local Planning Decisions to Transportation
Funding, supra note 111.
114 See SB 375, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); Darakjian, supra note
89, at 372; Fulton, supra note 112.
115 GIDDENS, supra note 110, at 100.
116 See Betsill & Bulkeley, supra note 3, at 144–45.
117 See Kacey Lizon, Sacramento Region Blueprint: Linking Land Use and
Transportation, SACOG, http://www.sacog.org/overview/sacramento-region-blueprint
[https://perma.cc/3ZZR-QUCP].
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structure, provided a politically acceptable alternative for left
and center-left politicians because it prevented the “free-
riderism” they associated with free-market strategies that they
anticipated would undermine the effectiveness of SB 375.118 On
the right, SACOG also proved satisfactory because regionalism
paid homage to the importance of local autonomy, especially in
land-use planning where centralized and top-down regulation
of land use and development are unacceptable to policymakers
of this ideological bent.119 Therefore, SACOG, as an MPO
governed through regionalism, was well situated to play the
key role of convener of SB 375’s roll-out and implementation.
Indeed, legislators believed MPOs were the best means of
implementing SB 375 precisely because of their political
acceptability to the state’s varied stakeholders.120
As a regionalist means of coordinating transportation
planning, SACOG’s policymaking process, like many MPOs’, is
intended to reflect the preferences of the cities and counties present
in the region. As a consequence, a networked form of regional
governance emerged from SACOG’s policymaking deliberations.
Individual members on SACOG’s board and planning committees
reflect locally elected officials and state agency representatives as
well as other private, commercial, and civic not-for-profit
stakeholders.121 The role of the board and its committees is to
provide technical input and analysis, specialized knowledge, and
stakeholder input for SACOG’s primary responsibility: planning
the region’s Metropolitan Transportation Plan (MTP) and
allocating federal transportation funds for the plan.122
By federal law, regional MPOs have significant flexibility
in structuring their internal decision-making processes as they
develop their MTPs.123 In SACOG’s case, a thirty-one-member
118 In this context the “free rider” problem reflects individual cities benefiting
from the collective pursuit of state GHG reduction goals, as mandated by AB 32 and SB
375, while they “selfishly” continue to develop without regard to their individual role in
promoting climate change. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 76 (1965). In short, AB 32 and SB 375
require all cities and counties to participate in reducing their GHG emissions if state
mandated goals are to be achieved. SB 375, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
119 Hanemann, supra note 109.
120 California’s SB 375 Would Tie Local Planning Decisions to Transportation
Funding, supra note 111.
121 JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT FOR THE SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS art. 5, § 5.0 (July 1, 2003), http://www.sacog.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/jpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ2V-JW4U].
122 Elisa Barbour & Elizabeth A. Deakin, Smart Growth Planning for Climate
Protection, 78 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 70, 72 (2012).
123 THOMAS W. SANCHEZ, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, AN INHERENT BIAS?
GEOGRAPHIC AND RACIAL-ETHNIC PATTERNS OFMETROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION
BOARDS 2 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20060124_mp
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board of directors is the governing body and every city and
county within the Sacramento metropolitan region holds a seat.
On SACOG’s board, voting is weighted by the population size of
each participating city and county. For example, Sacramento
City and Sacramento County, the most populated areas in the
region, have two and three seats, respectively.124 SACOG also
relies on a “triple-weighted” voting system to make transportation
and land development decisions more representative of the metro-
area population.125 For SACOG to adopt a measure, a majority of
the region’s cities and counties must support it, and in so doing,
a majority of the region’s population by extension are deemed to
support it through their city or county representatives.126
Practically speaking, this means that four of six counties and
twelve of twenty-two cities in SACOG’s defined MPO region
must support a measure for it to pass and move toward
implementation.127 This structure of representation helped to
legitimize SACOG’s regional governance and its pursuit of GHG
reductions insofar as its decision making includes representative
consideration of local governments and their populations.
This analysis of SACOG’s Blueprint Plan and the
subsequent drafting of SB 375 highlights the role of governance
expectations and activities—how state, regional, and local
entities are linked to one another—that can cohere or clash
with prevailing ideas regarding how government “ought” to be
organized. In SACOG’s case, left-leaning and centrist politicians
in California’s state capital rejected both command-centered and
neoliberal governance models.128 As a result, SB 375 reflected the
preferred option: reliance on regionalist governance networks
coordinated by MPOs. The legislation reflected SACOG’s
perceived success in implementing its Blueprint Plan because
SACOG had pursued its regional MTP reliant on a relatively open
planning process that brought in key stakeholders from across the
region. The structure of governance as represented in SACOG’s
regionalist approach—both in its intra-organizational attributes
and in the extra-organizational network it coordinated—neither
veered toward command authority nor neoliberalism, but rather
os.pdf [https://perma.cc/C86L-776X]; see Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87–866, 76 Stat. 1145, 1145–48 (1962).
124 JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT FOR THE SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 121, at art. 5, § 5.8.
125 See SACOG, SACOGHANDBOOK 22 (2015).
126 See JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT FOR THE SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 121, at art. 5, § 5.6.
127 SACOG, supra note 125, at 22.
128 Mary Lynne Vellinga, Growth Battle Rejoined—Steinberg’s Land-Use
Proposal Seeks to Avoid Previous Mistake, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 9, 2007, at B1.
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reflected SACOG’s efforts to reach out and appeal to its
stakeholders. The regionalist approach was recognized and
rewarded with a good deal of “structural legitimacy.”
B. Popular Legitimacy
Popular legitimacy refers to how a citizenry perceives a
governance entity. It refers to whether citizens deem that an
entity fulfilled institutionalized expectations regarding proper
levels of public involvement in decisions as well as in
implementation efforts once a policy has been created. Popular
legitimacy emerged with SACOG’s extensive outreach efforts and
was reflected in the citizen participation it encouraged through
the neighborhood meetings, workshops, and public forums it
sponsored. Popular legitimacy was also reflected in SACOG’s
adherence to decision rules that stressed regional representation
in its policymaking process.
Popular legitimacy, as a generic item, emerges from local
history, civic-political relations, and civic discourse that embeds
societal “trustees,” those vested with some form of public
authority, and their decisions in local social expectations.
Likewise, when citizens engage in a civic dialogue regarding a
policy or program’s design, implementation or its outcomes (real
or projected), they rely on shared expectations to compare,
contrast, and judge its worthiness. As a consequence, citizens are
more likely to consent and cooperate with requests, decrees, and
laws that mirror their expectations and, when their expectations
are met more readily, trust the governments that propose them.
The media, special interest groups, and social movements
frequently also play a role in helping to shape popular
impressions and, with those impressions, the credibility of a
proposed program or policy. At its base, then, popular legitimacy
is reflected in policy proposals that emerged from a process that
explicitly involves citizen participation, which, in turn, generates
the perception that policies are consonant with widely held
community norms and values.129
To promote popular legitimacy with its plans, SACOG
therefore deliberately sought to associate its Blueprint Plan with
democratic processes and principles. Indeed, SACOG not only
sought to play into such expectations but also to actively
cultivate civic engagement through its transportation and urban
planning agenda. Taking lessons learned in Portland, Oregon,
129 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 31 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
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and Salt Lake City, Utah, where urban planners had already
successfully incorporated high levels of public input into their
urban planning efforts, SACOG developed blueprinting as a
regional visioning process to highlight that it too was incorporating
citizen planners into its policymaking.130 These undertakings were
intended to appear open, deliberative, and democratic and involve
the region’s socioeconomic and ethnic diversity.131 As such, once
completed, SACOG could claim that the Blueprint Plan reflected
the region’s popular will.
The Blueprint visioning process itself took shape through
forty-four public workshops, organized at neighborhood, county,
and regional levels, where invited citizens, civic groups, and
commercial and local governmental stakeholders deliberated on
alternative regional growth plans.132 The neighborhood workshops
began in 2003 when SACOG convened meetings with residents in
twenty-five different regional communities with the purpose of
familiarizing them with the goals of the Blueprint Plan.133
SACOG also held significantly larger county-level forums,
including planning workshops, to spread the word about
transportation investment options and to gauge local preferences
for improving Sacramento’s regional transportation system.134 The
neighborhood and county meetings culminated in a “Regional
Forum” in October of 2004.135 This meeting involved some 1400
business leaders, elected officials, and “citizen planners.”136 SACOG
repeated the formula it had developed at the neighborhood and
county workshops, wherein participants scrutinized maps and data
supplied by SACOG that were oriented around four projected
growth scenarios. At the end of the event, after SACOG ran
through the data and answered questions, citizen planner
participants were urged to electronically “vote”—i.e., they were
polled—on their preferred growth scenario.137
The neighborhood, county, and regional forums were then
followed by a final “Elected Officials Summit” held in October of
2004.138 Eighty elected officials from across the Sacramento
metropolitan region attended.139 They were presented with the
130 See sources cited supra note 92.
131 Photographs used in SACOG publications portrayed citizen planners as a
racially and ethnically diverse group. See SACOG, supra note 98.
132 Id. at 2.
133 SACOG, supra note 98, at 1.
134 The Need for the Blueprint, SACRAMENTO REGION BLUEPRINT, http://www.
sacregionblueprint.org/process/ [https://perma.cc/N77C-YJ7V].
135 SACOG, supra note 98, at 2.
136 Id. at 2.
137 Id. at 2–4.
138 Id. at 1.
139 See SACOG, supra note 98, at 2.
2017] CLIMATE CHANGE AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE 749
results and summaries of the surveys and polls taken of
“citizen planners” over the preceding months at the visioning
forums.140 These surveys showed that 99% of regional leaders
preferred development directed by “smart growth principles.”141
As with the previous workshops, the forum culminated in another
chance to “vote.”142 Using electronic keypads, officials
overwhelmingly approved143 the growth scenario favored by prior
local and county participants in the Regional Forum. SACOG
leadership also advocated for this voting system as a means of
establishing popular legitimacy.
In November 2004, the SACOG board voted and
approved the “preferred plan,” a plan that SACOG had largely
scripted in advance of the meetings and votes, but that had
been confirmed through an organized sequence of workshops,
forums, and public meetings.144 In truth, the blueprint process
advocated by SACOG and the scenarios preferred by “citizen
planners” at SACOG’s public forums were one in the same; a
majority of participants wanted a less congested, less polluted,
more walkable region with a lower carbon footprint while
maintaining the promise of continued economic growth.145
Having been educated to prefer the seven smart growth options
embodied in the Blueprint Plan, citizen planners then voted to
embrace those options.146
SACOG reports regarding the Blueprint Plan and their
blueprinting efforts also featured photographs of their workshops
and forums that purposively highlighted the diversity of citizen
participants, showing them engaging with one another and
SACOG planners around tables with SACOG literature,
computers, and regional maps that illustrated the different
140 Id. at 1–2.
141 Mary Lynne Vellinga, Forum Favors a New Direction for Development,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2004, at B1.
142 We would like to emphasize that the citizen planners were not truly voting in
so far as they were deciding an actual outcome. More, the voting represented a polling by
SACOG of their opinions. The difference is important: the idea that citizens were actually
voting on an outcome fed into the popular legitimacy that both the Blueprint Plan and
SACOG achieved by deploying the language and façade of a democratic process.
143 In this summit, several questions were used to poll participants that asked in
different language essentially the same question: did the respondent support SACOG’s
Blueprint Plan. In this poll, approval exceeded 50% ranging from 78%–92% of those
polled expressed support for the Blueprint preferred scenario. SACOG, Elected Officials
Summit the Blueprint: Transportation and Land Use Plan (2016).
144 See SACOG, supra note 98.
145 Id.
146 See SACOG, TALL ORDER REGIONAL FORUM: CHOICES FOR OUR FUTURE
(2004), http://old.sacog.org/publications/Forum2004Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W6
H-EZRL].
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development options.147 SACOG used these images in subsequent
publications, event announcements, and media spots to
emphasize the participatory aspect of the Blueprint.148 Indeed,
these became visual tropes, routinely used by SACOG as it sought
to associate itself and the Blueprint with deliberative and
participatory aspects of the Blueprint Plan’s “visioning” process.
The association with the popular will lent SACOG’s Blueprint
Plan the requisite popular legitimacy it required to design the
region’s transportation future.
SACOG’s public relations and promotional materials
highlighted the convergence of its Blueprint Plan’s ambitions
and the preferences expressed by citizen planners, at workshops,
forums, and the summit of elected leaders. Moreover, SACOG
officials repeatedly highlighted the deliberative and diversity
aspects of the public forums as well as the “general consensus”
that had been reached through them.149 Over time, SACOG’s
blueprinting process caught on; it gained a great deal of regional
credibility for articulating a plan that seemingly dovetailed with
local preferences and that therefore gave SACOG the popular
legitimacy it needed to push through its preferred regional
transportation and land-use agenda.
Through the blueprinting process, SACOG pursued a
strategy designed to lend their regional planning efforts popular
legitimacy. SACOG moved their planning processes much closer
to local constituents through the workshops, forums, and
neighborhood meetings. They also deployed technical
presentations and participatory tools that facilitated a sense of
inclusion, transparency, and decision-making participation.150 The
priority given to citizen involvement partly reflected that SACOG,
as an MPO, has little command authority over cities or counties
and is also a nonelected governance body. And while SACOG’s
board of directors is mainly composed of regionally elected
officials, as an MPO, it is vulnerable to the criticism that it does
not reflect the local popular will. SACOG’s active inclusion of
“citizen-planners” in its transportation design and planning
processes acted to blunt potential criticisms and provide a
mechanism through which it could gain the necessary legitimacy
and, with it, regional support to carry out its legislative mandate.
147 Elisabeth Sherwin, Meeting Mulls Region’s Future Growth, DAVIS
ENTERPRISE, May 3, 2004.
148 SACOG, supra note 98.
149 BARBOUR& TEITZ, supra note 88, at iii.
150 For a discussion of Technological Legitimacy, see infra Section III.C.
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C. Technological Legitimacy
Government and governing bodies typically rely on a
range of technologies to pursue their mandates. For example,
SACOG routinely sought support for its actions by associating
them with “high-tech” models, plans, and solutions.151 The
importance of technology, and with it technological legitimacy, is
not well developed in the legitimation literature. Yet appeals to
data-driven and evidence-based policies, performance-based
measurements and policy “dashboards,”152 as well as high-tech
formulations like “e-government”153 or “Gov 2.0”154 exemplify the
current reality that perceptions of “better governance” and “better
results” are highly associated with plans and policies that make
use of the latest technologies. Technology in instances like this
represents higher levels of effectiveness; use of high-order
technology tools signifies good leadership and innovative efforts
and therefore conveys to the public a high level of sophistication.
Indeed, SACOG deployed a number of new techniques
and technologies in their blueprinting efforts to enrich the
context within which citizen planners would define their
preferences—and thereby achieved technological legitimacy. For
example, they simulated development scenarios for different
neighborhoods and cities across the region.155 SACOG displayed
different future growth scenarios on video-projected regional
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) generated maps that
were color-coded according to the growth patterns associated
with them such as the sprawl, traffic congestion, and housing
density they might affect.156
To produce these visually stunning depictions of the
region’s “possibilistic” futures, SACOG relied on a number of
leading planning software programs, including I-PLACE3S,
SACMET, and MEPLAN to build visualizations for the
workshops and forums.157 While MEPLAN and SACMET
151 See SACOG, supra note 146.
152 See Thomas Plant & Janine Douglas, The Performance Management
Continuum in Municipal Government Organizations, 45 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
43, 45 (2006).
153 Mark Howard, e-Government Across the Globe: How Will “e” Change
Government?, GOV’T FIN. REV. 6, 6–9 (2001).
154 Enrico Ferro & Francesco Molinari, Making Sense of Gov 2.0 Strategies:
“No Citizens, No Party”, 2 J. EDEMOCRACY 56, 56–68 (2010).
155 See generally Technology of the Blueprint: Workshop Participants Can See
Future Today with I-PLACE3S Software, SACRAMENTO REGION BLUEPRINT, http://www.
sacregionblueprint.org/technology/ [https://perma.cc/VJB8-U5FP].
156 See id.
157 Specifically, I-PLACE3S software allowed citizen planners, with guidance
from SACOG’s staff of urban planners, to manipulate land uses for individual parcels
in the region to view how changing neighborhoods might affect broader transportation
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operated in the background, these technologies supplied SACOG
planners with the tools necessary to “wow” citizen planners, city
and county officials, and other stakeholders at the workshops as
cutting-edge planning technologies.158
New technologies such as these became part of SACOG’s
larger legitimation strategy because they facilitated SACOG’s
pursuit of a general set of ideals and ambitions that regional
stakeholders already wanted to pursue—namely, a higher
quality of life. Through the use of technologically driven visual
cues and a clicker-based polling processes, over time SACOG
was able to engender a sense of regional consensus that the
Blueprint Plan was a success.159 These technological measures
were thus a central medium through which SACOG anchored
its blueprint efforts.
That SACOG celebrated I-PLACE3S, MEPLAN, and
SACMET as innovative technological tools in its own publications
suggests that their role was more than functional, but also
reflected an attempt to cultivate legitimacy among the regions’
stakeholders.160 Ultimately, we cannot say whether or not these
technological elements were the basis for higher levels of public
approval, but the local press repeatedly lauded SACOG’s use of
them. What is more, the role played by “citizen planners” in
SACOG’s virtual planning forums through electronic polling (or
“voting”) and visualization also played an important role in the
awards bestowed on SACOG by professional associations and the
federal government.161 The connection to professional associations
and expert knowledge was also important to SACOG’s
blueprinting process. Closely related to technological legitimacy,
professional legitimacy was a key element in SACOG’s perceived
Blueprint Plan’s success that we take up below.
and land-use planning outcomes. Also important, and underlying the use of I-
PLACE3S, was SACOG’s use of MEPLAN, a land-use forecasting model that allows
transportation analysis and provides mapping aspects for illustrating different growth
scenarios too, and SACMET, which enables the mapping of regional travel demand and
therefore the generation of impact assessment and output that further enhanced the
modeling of different regional growth scenarios. See Infrastructure Cost Model,
SACRAMENTO REGION BLUEPRINT, http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/technology/
infrastructure-cost-model/ [https://perma.cc/934N-W34E]; Travel Model, SACRAMENTO
REGION BLUEPRINT, http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/technology/travel-model/ [https://
perma.cc/B5H6-BS5Q].
158 See supra note 157.
159 Elisabeth Sherwin, Video Conference Will Look at Transportation, DAVIS
ENTERPRISE, Nov. 3, 2006.
160 Tools & Data, SACOG, http://www.sacog.org/tools-data [https://perma.cc/T
XW6-Z3LG].
161 See SACOG, supra note 100, at 2–3, 16.
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D. Professional Legitimacy
Governance entities can also justify their actions by
aligning them with professional credentials, associations,
standards, and bodies of knowledge. The invocation of expertise is
a means of cloaking governance actions in rationality. Expert
knowledge and technocracy often stand in contrast with citizen
input in democratic processes insofar as they are founded in
distinctive governance principles.162 Some have even argued that
the use of expert knowledge to legitimize governance often masks
elite interests and should be viewed critically.163 In SACOG’s case,
the credibility of their blueprinting process largely hinged on their
rhetorical marriage of “regional values” with professionally
derived “smart growth” planning principles. Put directly, by
marrying “democratic principles”—i.e., structural and popular
legitimacy—with professionally motivated “technocratic” ones—
i.e., technical and professional legitimacy—SACOG gained
regional support and the veneer of success it required to ratify
its Blueprint Plan. The professional concepts that stand behind
smart growth originate in reactions against suburban
development, or “sprawl.”164 Post-WWII urban sprawl led to a
critique in the 1980s that had professional urban and regional
planners rethinking metropolitan development. Reference to
“smarter growth” was meant to capture a range of ideas about
how to avoid the negative aspect of urban-suburban sprawl.165
Strategies meant to stave off such sprawl included encouraging
compact development, mixed commercial and residential land
use, and reliance on public transportation.166
In 1991, the Local Government Commission—a
nonprofit urban planning organization in Sacramento—
convened to develop a set of principles to govern land-use
planning.167 The result was the “Ahwahnee Principles,” an early
162 THOMAS D. BEAMISH, COMMUNITY AT RISK: BIODEFENSE AND THE
COLLECTIVE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 35–38 (2015); see Éric Montpetit, Policy Design for
Legitimacy: Expert Knowledge, Citizens, Time and Inclusion in the United Kingdom’s
Biotechnology Sector, 86 PUB. ADMIN. 259, 264–67 (2008).
163 See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler, The Legitimacy of Private Transnational Governance:
Experts and the Transnational Market for Force, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 157 (2010); Christina
Boswell, The Political Functions of Expert Knowledge: Knowledge and Legitimation in
European Union Immigration Policy, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 471 (2008).
164 ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: SUBURBAN SPRAWL
AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 1–3 (2001).
165 Patricia E. Salkin, Implementation of the APA Growing Smart Legislative
Guidebook: Beginning to Benchmark Success, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 339, 340–41 (2004).
166 Tom Daniels, Smart Growth: A New American Approach to Regional
Planning, 16 PLANN. PRAC. & RES. 271, 271–77 (2001).
167 PETER CALTHORPE ET AL., LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, THE AHWAHNEE
PRINCIPLES FOR RESOURCE EFFICIENT COMMUNITIES (1991).
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charter that developed smart growth principles to guide regional
development.168 In 2002, the American Planning Association
(APA) published a national guide to smart growth titled, Growing
Smart Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for Planning and
the Management of Change.169 In it, the APA outlined an
ambitious planning agenda of standards, regulatory changes,
and financing options that it suggested states, regions, and
locales pursue to “combat urban sprawl, protect farmland,
promote affordable housing, and encourage redevelopment.”170
In the blueprinting process, SACOG married the
Ahwahnee Principles with the APA’s recommendations, leading
to a seven-point program that (1) created more transportation
options, (2) encouraged mixed land uses, (3) promoted compact
development, (4) provided greater housing choices, (5) utilized
existing assets, (6) encouraged quality design, and (7) conserved
the region’s natural resources.171 Advocates for the Blueprint Plan
argued that it provided a superior vehicle for pursuing
community development because, at the heart of the plan, were
accomplished professional planners who were applying state-of-
the-art knowledge.172 Summarized in repeated reference to
SACOG’s “smart growth principles,” this conveyed that
transportation and land-use planning in the Sacramento region
was at the cutting edge.173
The professionalism associated with the Blueprint was
further underscored, even amplified, by the awards that
professional groups, associations, and the federal government
conferred on SACOG’s Blueprint Plan and its blueprinting
process—particularly the inclusiveness and civic engagement it
claimed to promote. Indeed, such awards could only reflect
blueprinting as a process since they were conferred before the
Blueprint Plan had or could achieve the outcomes it was tasked
with attaining.174 It was not through material attainments such
as lowered GHGs, but rather through its linkage of legitimacy
founded in professionalism and expertise as well as that
deriving from regional engagement in democratic processes,
168 Id.
169 Growing Smart Guidebook, AM. PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.planning.org/
growingsmart/ [https://perma.cc/5DWB-3L59].
170 Id.
171 See CALTHORPE ET AL., supra note 167, at 2–3.
172 See SACOG, supra note 98, at 15.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 16.
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that the Blueprint Plan gained its reputation as a “successful”
means of planning regional transportation and land use.175
Indeed, founded on this reputation as a regional,
statewide, and national success, the blueprinting process quickly
became a standard for metropolitan planning in California and
the development of long-range transportation plans. The
blueprinting process was institutionalized in California law
when the State Assembly ratified SB 375. That is, in June 2005,
soon after SACOG’s ratification of its regionally preferred
Blueprint Plan and MTP, the California legislature allocated
funding for selected state metropolitan areas to model their
efforts after SACOG’s Blueprint Plan and the blueprinting
processes reflected therein.176 The program was called the
“Blueprint Learning Network.”177 The legislature justified its
funding of the program by explaining that future quality of life
and community growth required that California metropolitan
areas integrate transportation, housing, land use, environmental
resources, and other infrastructure and services, and that the
Blueprint Plan provided a roadmap for doing so.
IV. SUMMARY ANDDISCUSSION
This article offers an analysis of an emergent governance
strategy, “blueprinting,” that has been widely heralded as a
success by the planning profession, by the federal government,
California’s legislature, and the press.178 The Sacramento Area
Council of Government initially designed and pursued its
Blueprint Plan in a highly uncertain policy context where they,
as a Metropolitan Planning Organization, held little command
authority and only the limited means to incentivize regional
governments and populations to comply with their policy
mandate and aspirations. With its original intent to moderate
urban-suburban sprawl,179 SACOG’s planning staff emphasized
legitimating their efforts to gain public favor and the support of
regional elites. The plan gained such support that it was later
adapted as SB 375. As our prior research suggests, despite its
175 Senator Steinberg makes this argument in California’s SB 375 Would Tie
Local Planning Decisions to Transportation Funding, supra note at 111.
176 Blueprint Learning Network, CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/
tpp/offices/orip/bln.html [https://perma.cc/38NF-QBS3].
177 Id.
178 Mike McKeever, Sacramento Region Develops New Paradigm for
Transportation Planning 9, SACOG, http://www.sacog.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/2008-09-03_exhibit_a_-_new_paradigm_trans._planning.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BQZ2-R4Z4].
179 See Darakjian, supra note 89, at 380–83.
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regional embrace, its diffusion across California, and its role as
the basis for landmark climate legislation, the Blueprint Plan
and its successor SB 375 are unlikely to deliver significant
GHG reductions.180 The question this article addresses,
therefore, is why SACOG’s Blueprint Plan has come to be
considered such an unmitigated success given that it has little
chance of delivering the GHG attainments and other negative
urban development outcomes it was mandated with achieving?
The answer we found lies not in the Blueprint Plan
achieving measurable material outcomes, such as lower GHG
emissions or reduced traffic congestion, but rather in the
decoupling of such outcomes from the Blueprint’s legitimacy as
a plan and more importantly as a planning process.
Specifically, we found that four distinctive types of legitimation
emerged out of the blueprinting process that marked it as a
successful policy. The first form of legitimacy reflected structural
aspects of blueprinting as a policy process. SACOG’s regionalist
“third way” approach reflected neither command nor market
principles and was therefore relatively unthreatening to metro-
area political and commercial elites or the population in general.
As a policy strategy, the structure of authority and decision-
making power gained the Blueprint Plan considerable “structural
legitimacy” because many stakeholders in the region found it
preferable to the typical alternatives: either command-and-control
regulatory government or laissez-faire policy approaches.
The blueprinting process also generated goodwill and
popular trust in SACOG and its policy efforts and therefore
gained what we term “popular legitimacy,” too. Popular
legitimacy reflected the Blueprint Plan’s strong emphasis on civic
engagement and participation as exemplified in the numerous
neighborhood, county, and regional workshops and forums
wherein “citizen-planners” “voted” for their preferences during
such meetings. In this capacity, the blueprinting process as a
policy strategy gained SACOG and the Blueprint Plan a good bit of
positive regional notoriety and was acclaimed by professional
planners and legislators for its transparency, inclusiveness, and for
the options it seemed to provide citizen-planners even though most
of those options were already vetted and represented in the
Blueprint Plan as a preferred development option for the region.181
SACOG’s blueprinting process also incorporated the use
of high-technology that enhanced the public and participatory
aspects of transportation policymaking that were a sensation at its
180 See Niemeier, Grattet & Beamish, supra note 14, at 1613–15.
181 See supra Part III.
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public workshops and forums. The use of high-tech “click polling,”
maps and mapping software, and impressive visualizations of the
region’s development options were all routinely highlighted in news
press accounts and by SACOG in its promotional materials. The
use of such tools and the stir they generated among workshop
and public forum participants, as well as the local and regional
press, afforded SACOG what we term “technological legitimacy,”
approval that also played an important role in the Blueprint
Plan’s perceived success.
Finally, SACOG sought to personify professionalism in
its Blueprint Plan by framing its blueprinting efforts as
reflecting expert-inspired planning principles such as “smart
growth” and other state-of-the-art knowledge in a bid to gain
regional support and stymie resistance. In truth, the citizen
workshops and forums were as much about educating political
elites and the public regarding the “best” urban development
trends as they were about convincing the public to follow
SACOG’s preferred plan. Yet the line between “education” and
“suasion” as reflected in the practice of educating the public—
polling them regarding their preferences with a limited number
of development options (four), and then choosing the Blueprint
Plan—was indefinite at best. Teaching participants that the
Blueprint Plan reflected “smart growth” highlighted that it was
a state-of-the-art policy aligned with principles and ideas
rooted in professional planning knowledge. We refer to this
form of credibility as “professional legitimacy” since it reflected
the professional knowledge and expertise SACOG paid homage
to and used to its benefit when seeking to gain support for its
Blueprint Plan.
V. LOOKING FORWARD
This article began by identifying the challenge climate
change poses to the current political-economic contexts. Namely,
legal and policy strategies must both effectively reduce GHG
emissions and align with contemporary expectations regarding
the exercise of government authority. Determining how to reduce
carbon emissions is largely a technical issue. Society currently
has the scientific know-how to dramatically reduce the use of
fossil fuels to power cars, homes, and commercial activities, yet,
these issues require fundamental changes to a contemporary way
of life that reflects ideological commitments, values, and
assumptions regarding such things as individual freedoms, civic
inclusion, private property, and economic growth. As a result,
there is considerable uncertainty about the forms policies should
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take so that they align with both material considerations and
legitimate social and political means of governance from which
social trust in government is largely based.
Moreover, the problem of climate change has emerged at
a time when command-and-control forms of governance and
regulation are out of favor for all but the most extreme
circumstances and public policies, such as fighting crime and
terrorism. Importantly, markets, incentives, and volunteerism
have proven equally unsupportable among those on the center-
left, who see it as capitulation to industry and commercial
interests and against the common or collective good.182 In this
context, compromise is the only viable alternative, but even this
has proven extremely difficult to achieve.183 Indeed, despite most
efforts made across the nation, no compromise has been possible.
As a consequence, climate change has gone largely unaddressed.184
Given our findings, legitimacy must be acknowledged as a
crucial aspect of policy design and implementation. Policymakers
ignore it at their own peril. What is more, an important
implication for policy and policymakers of our typology is that
legitimacy must be viewed not as a singular “thing,” and therefore
corresponding strategy, but as a multifaceted phenomenon that
requires multiple actions to achieve. The different legitimation
strategies we observed evoked different responses and resonated
for different reasons with different policy stakeholders.
From this, an important cautionary tale emerged from
our research that is directed at the policy world. It suggests
policymakers take heed of legitimacy concerns as they plan and
seek to implement their policies, but also to beware, since simple,
even seemingly innocuous, missteps can lead to public distrust
and policy rejection.185 Some regions and their publics may be
compelled by how governance is structured, such as how
authority is distributed, where responsibility decisions reside, and
whether some form of due process is expected before decisions are
made. Others might demand high levels of transparency,
participation, and civic engagement in order to feel that policies
are representative and therefore serving the public good. Still
182 For a broader discussion of how conservative policies in the 1980s and 1990s
prioritized market-based solutions resulting in a boon to economic elites, see Thomas W.
Volscho & Nathan J. Kelly, The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial
Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 679, 684,
693 (2012).
183 Theda Skocpol, Naming the Problem: What It Will Take to Counter
Extremism and Engage Americans in the Fight Against Global Warming (2013) (prepared
for the Symposium on “The Politics of America’s Fight Against Global Warming”).
184 GIDDENS, supra note 1, at 4–5.
185 BEAMISH, supra note 162, at 35–38.
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others may view policies that are associated with high-technology
modeling, applications, and visualizations to be in-step with best
practices and therefore exemplars of sound policy prescription.
Finally, close association with high levels of expertise and the
professional acumen—state-of-the-art knowledge—is another
justification for support of a given policy and its plans or, on
the contrary, lack of its rejection.
Although we have presented a typology that distinguishes
types of legitimation strategies, we would not insist that what we
presented here represents an exhaustive list of legitimacy types,
nor that the different forms are entirely distinct from one another.
It should also be of some interest to policymakers as to whether or
not different forms of legitimacy may come into conflict with one
another. For instance, there may be a principle-based conflict
between popular legitimacy and its emphasis on “democratic
participation” and “citizen choices” and that of professional
legitimacy with its emphasis on “expertise” and “authoritative
knowledge.”186 Yet, this tension did not emerge in our
investigations of the Blueprint Plan even though it has in other
policy contexts.187
One can also think of the different forms of legitimacy as
intertwined or “braided” with one another, where two or more
strategies are bundled together as one. For example, citizen
stakeholders were indeed brought into the process, but they
were not left an open forum to air their preferences. Rather, they
were guided in their decisions by SACOG’s professionals who
educated them and then channeled their choices through a
closed-set of prearranged alternatives.188 In this sense, the
“popular” and “professional” forms of legitimacy were braided
together in the SACOG case. Braiding is also reflected in the
ways that technological legitimacy and professional legitimacy
reinforced one another while remaining distinct. Applying the
latest technologies and methods is an expectation of experts. The
use of high-tech tools was also meant to “wow” stakeholders, and
in SACOG’s case, engender a feeling of active engagement in the
policy process. In this way, the different strands of legitimacy
were woven together in the blueprinting process in a manner that
186 See discussion in K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC
METHOD: METHODOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH EVALUATING SOCIETAL
HAZARDS 3–14 (1985).
187 See generally id.; BRIAN WYNNE, RATIONALITY AND RITUAL: THE WINDSCALE
INQUIRY AND NUCLEAR DECISIONS IN BRITAIN (1982); BARBARA L. ALLEN, UNEASY
ALCHEMY: CITIZENS AND EXPERTS IN LOUISIANA’S CHEMICAL CORRIDOR DISPUTES (2003);
DEL SESTO, supra note 56.
188 See supra Part III.
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promoted the Blueprint Plan’s perceived “success” even before it
could achieve the mandates it had been created to achieve.
Finally, an important policy insight gleaned from prior
studies of legitimacy is the inclination for organizational actors,
in highly uncertain environments, to decouple formally
recognized organizational structures and processes from
manifest goals and outcomes.189 Organizational actors do so as
they pursue stakeholder legitimacy and support by aligning their
activities with their institutional environments. This observation
is highly relevant to understanding SACOG’s organizational
strategies in seeking to implement its preferred Blueprint Plan.
Whether SACOG’s Blueprinting Plan will succeed in reducing
GHGs as AB 32 and SB 375 mandates is still not known. As
revealed in our prior research, however, there is reason to believe
that SACOG’s Blueprint Plan will not reach GHG targets nor
significantly reduce the region’s output by 2020.190 Nonetheless,
the blueprinting process has been labeled a success. Indeed, early
acclaim translated the Blueprint Plan into California law as
climate-fighting legislation SB 375. Given our findings regarding
the important part that policy legitimation played, we recommend
asking hard questions of “successful” governance strategies like
blueprinting because when policy processes are decoupled from
policy outcomes, meaningful progress on important societal
problems and issues can be lost or at least downplayed. In the
case of the Blueprint Plan, this could mean that a seemingly
“successful policy” meant to reduce California’s GHG emissions
fails to significantly do so.
189 Boxenbaum & Jonsson, supra note 46, at 79.
190 Niemeier, Grattet & Beamish, supra note 14, at 1613.
